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Introduction 
Entire sectors of the critical national infrastructure rely upon the vast systems of computers 
and networks that comprise our Information Inpastructure. The ongoing physical and 
economic well being of our country is based on the ability of this infrastructure to process 
data securely and reliably. Yet, daily we learn more and more about vulnerabilities in the 
networks, operating systems, and applications that form the very fabric of the Information 
Infrastructure. The nation is clearly at risk in its lack of readiness for cyber attacks. 
In our zeal to capitalize on the explosive advances in commercial computer technology 
over the last 10 to 15 years, we have ignored the requirements to deploy computing systems 
with the ability to protect data according to its criticality and value to us. During this time, 
the US Government and Military focus on commercial ofthe sheIfprocurements helped to 
he1 the technology explosion, but it also contributed to the lack of advances in the ability 
of commercial systems to appropriately protect themselves and the data with which they are 
entrusted. While industry has been driven to supply the latest technology at the fastest 
pace, it has not been motivated, either internally or externally via customer demand, to 
produce trustworthy computing systems. Through neglect, the national capability to 
design and construct trusted computers and networks has begun to atrophy. Not only has 
the information infrastructure been built weakly, but also our capability to strengthen it 
continues to decline. The Nation is now lacking in both the research and development 
talent to produce trusted computing systems and the educational infrastructure to create this 
talent. 
The Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research (CISR) in Monterey, California, proposes a 
three-pronged approach to strengthen the national information infrastructure and 
reinvigorate the national capability to produce trustworthy computing systems. 
First, we describe our Trusted Computing Exemplar project as a worked example 
of how trusted computing systems and components can be constructed. 
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. Second, we define a national research initiative to advance the theoretical 
foundations for trusted computing and to produce a set of automated tools to 
support the development of high assurance systems; and 
Third, we define an educational initiative based on nascent Information Assurance 
education programs and the Trusted Computing Exemplar to provide a framework 
for Trusted Computer Development education. 
The result of this multi-faceted approach will be to increase the security of the national 
Information Infi.astructure by increasing the availability of: 
Trusted Computer systems and components 
Trusted Computer development tools, and 
Trusted Computer developers, evaluators and educators 
. 
. . 
We begin with a more detailed description of the need for strong trusted computing and an 
overview of the degraded state of trusted computing in the United States. 
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Current lack of Trusted Computing Infrastructure 
Trusted computing is special. It addresses not only the problems of frontal attack to systems 
and malicious software, but also that of subversion: the equivalent of software "moles1' in 
the system. Such "moles" can be trap doors or other inserted artifices. They can be triggered 
by conditions determined by the adversary and, when active, can be used to launch any 
attack the adversary desires. The safeguards required to protect systems from trap doors go 
beyond those required to protect either against frontal attack or Trojan Horses. Trusted 
computing encompasses the science and engineering required to specify, design, 
implement, and maintain components in which we have a high level of confidence against 
system subversion. 
To protect against frontal attacks, systems must be designed and implemented without 
exploitable flaws and must be designed to constrain access to information and confine any 
damage resulting from the execution of malicious software. This approach acknowledges 
the mathematically proven limits of computability by accepting the fact that there is no way 
to automatically inspect all software to determine whether its behavior is benign. Instead 
most software is considered to be potentially malicious and its execution is circumscribed 
such that the effects of any malicious activity can be controlled and audited. To protect 
against trap doors requires an approach to system lifecycle that is structured so that systems 
can be subjected to analysis that demonstrates the absence of internal subversion. It is the 
proof of absence of unspecified functionality that distinguishes trusted computing from 
safety and other forms of high confidence computing. 
The science and discipline of trusted computing has been neglected for well over a decade. 
For example, in one national laboratory where one might expect such expertise, scientists 
and engineers freely admit that those who have joined the field of computer and network 
security over the past 15 years are ignorant of the science and discipline that must be 
applied in the area of highly trusted computing. 
This section is intended to provide an overview of the current state of trusted computing in 
the United States. Topics to be covered include: education, practitioners, tools, trusted 
systems and components, decline in U.S. capabilities, and observations regarding non-US 
capabilities. We will see that there is a strong interdependence between several of these 
areas and that weakness in one weakens others. 
Education 
Colleges and universities produce the teachers and practitioners of scientific and technical 
disciplines. In traditional computer science departments, computer and network security 
have not been considered mainstream topics. As a consequence, senior faculty often lack an 
appreciation for this discipline and do not provide adequate encouragement to junior faculty 
or graduate students to pursue it. The recent surge in recognition of the need for improved 
computer and network security has attracted new faculty to the area. Unfortunately, these 
faculty are often unaware of the developments in trusted computing that have preceded 
them. Consequently they teach what they know and attempt to adapt it to the problem of 
computer security. The overall pathetic state of computer security in all sectors has resulted 
in a constant barrage of frontal, direct attacks on systems and their exploitation by a variety 
of viruses and simple malicious software instances. Thus, instead of addressing the 
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underlying problems of flawed design and inadequate partitioning of execution domains, 
much less the problem of proof of the absence of artifices and trapdoors, most current 
pedagogy focuses on superficial fixes. Students are taught to construct and configure 
systems in the hope that by creating a maze of weak defenses, adversaries will be thwarted. 
Substantial teaching and research effort are applied to the construction of adaptive, but 
superficial, protection systems; provision of security functions lacking concomitant 
assurances that the functions cannot be bypassed; attempts to solve theoretically 
undecideable problems; etc. 
With a few notable exceptions, the entire approach to teaching trusted computing misses 
the mark. Students are unaware that systems can be constructed that do not present the 
flaws that are so easily exploited in direct attacks. They do not know how to construct 
systems that confine and control malicious software. They are not taught the techniques that 
must be used to ensure the absence of trapdoors and that do ensure that protections are 
correct and complete. 
Today, even if faculty wanted to learn about the science, tools, development methods, and 
processes required for trusted system construction, most of the information they need is 
unavailable. Indeed there are papers in the research literature describing the theory of 
trusted computing and there are summaries providing an overview of the results of a 
number of trusted computing initiatives. But the reality is that much of the science and 
technology behind those early initiatives was folded into proprietary documents and may 
forever be unavailable to the academic community. 
Practitioners 
Two decades ago relatively large commercial teams were engaged in the development of 
strong trusted systems. It was a time when practitioners were learning the scientific and 
social processes required for the development. It was a time when that which worked in 
practice was distilled from a broad range of less effective techniques, a time when the first 
tools for trusted systems development were being created and used. It was also a time when 
the US Government encouraged vendors to develop trusted systems. Thus many of the 
practitioners of trusted computing were developing proprietary systems. 
Commercial computing blossomed. Office automation proceeded with great rapidity, 
personal computers were becoming ubiquitous, and use of the Internet was expanding. 
Eventually, trade-offs began to be made during system acquisitions. Insecure systems were 
chosen rather than secure ones for a number of reasons. Government acquisitions ceased to 
specify the need for strong trusted computing, and vendors lost confidence in a process that 
had initially encouraged them to invest in development of strong trusted systems. A 
downward spiral in trusted computing began and continues to this day. Thus, as support of 
trusted computing waned, the core of scientists and engineers who could build highly 
trusted systems dispersed to find opportunities elsewhere. 
Not only were developers impacted, but the lack of requests for highly trusted computing 
systems resulted in a dwindling need for those capable of conducting independent 
evaluations of such systems. The commercial laboratories that have since been established 




A rigorous methodology is required to construct highly trusted systems. All non-trivial 
systems require the use of tools to support the development effort and to provide proofs and 
evaluation evidence regarding the absence of subversion. 
The current availability of tools for trusted computing development programs is affected by 
two factors. First, many of the tools previously developed for trusted computing efforts 
, have disappeared or have become obsolete as a result of the absence of platforms and 
operating systems upon which to run them. Second, because there has been, in effect, a 15- 
year hiatus in the area of trusted computing, little research and development has been 
applied to the improvement and extension of the available toolset. 
Current activity in computer science and engineering that addresses assurance is focused on 
the correct function of systems and software: that the systems will function as’specified. 
This has resulted in advances in system safety and reliability. Thus, where one can describe 
(viz., mathematically specify) the safety and/or reliability properties of a system, it is 
possible to provide various levels of assurance that these properties will be satisfied in 
specified environments. But these systems make one important assumption, that all of the 
users and developers want the system to do the right thing. They assume that system 
failures are a result of random errors in the external environment and not the result of 
malicious activities addressed to subvert the system. In computer security, we must address 
the specification, design, implementation, and maintenance of a system in which the 
assumption must be that there will be ongoing attempts to insert functionality into the 
system that is unspecified and will perform clandestinely on behalf of an adversary. The 
malicious activity can occur during any phase of the system with the goal to either modify 
the system during its construction (subversion) or to take advantage of weaknesses in the 
design, implementation, configuration or management of the system to subvert its intended 
security functionality. Thus, in trusted computing, we are faced with an ongoing malicious 
threat to the integrity of the system. 
To address the problem of subversion, the insertion of unwanted functionality during 
construction, special tools are required to (1) describe the desired security properties of the 
system and (2) guarantee that the implementation of the system has these desired security 
properties and that the properties cannot be subverted. To achieve the first goal one needs 
languages to describe the security properties. To achieve the second, one needs to be able to 
mathematically ensure that the implementations, the architecture, the detailed design, the 
software, the management plan, including the hardware where practical, actually implement 
exactly the security properties described in part one and no more. In this way one can 
ensure that no subversion has taken place. 
During the era of government support for strong trusted computing, there was research and 
development of tools to support the formal, mathematical demonstration of the absence of 
subversion. These tools supported description of security policies, specifications of designs, 
verification that the designs implemented security policies, and a mapping of the design to 
the code. There was limited support for “code” proofs. 
In addition, tools were developed to support the connections between the formal 
descriptions of the system and the testing that the components and systems underwent. As 
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part of this testing and analysis, some work was done to identify and limit “covert 
channels,” which could be used by a malicious insider to communicate, using system 
resources, with a colleague on the outside. 
Various U.S. Government agencies supported the development of these tools. The National 
Computer Security Center maintained an Endorsed Tools List of formal verification 
systems for security modeling. These verification systems encompassed mathematical 
specification languages that dlow correctness conditions to be expressed, and reasoning 
mechanisms that included functions for parsing specifications, verifying specification 
legality, and providing verified conclusions regarding the satisfaction of the correctness 
conditions. Each system was characterized by its rules and organization; features and 
functionality; the level of trust that could be ascribed to the verification system itself; and 
its documentation. 
The hardware engineering community, for example Intel and to a lesser extent, AMD, have 
both invested heavily in the use of “formal methods” and have developed tools to assist in 
the analysis of complex chip designs and implementations. This work has been spurred on 
by the discovery that these methods are cost effective in the chip design process. 
In contrast, the software development community has not made significant use of these 
tools; instead, they have tried to address the issues of software complexity and assurance by 
advocating various development “methodologies.” Since software is relatively “easy” to 
update if bugs are found, there is no incentive to provide up-front correctness that has 
driven the use of formal methods in the hardware world, The assumption is that since 
software is “SO complex,” its properties cannot be specified and hence any attempts at 
formalisms are doomed to failure at the outset. The software development community is 
generally unaware of the “formal methods” successes of the past and hence may see 
specification and verification as being an additional cost burden, with no apparent gain. 
Hence, in the United States, over the last 15 years, there has been little development of the 
mathematics, science, engineering, technology and tools that could be used to provide a 
high degree of assurance that software meets not only its safety and reliability goals, but 
also its security goals. 
Trusted Systems and Components 
Few strong trusted systems are currently available as commercial products and those that 
are available are inadequate for modem use. What happened to all of the government- 
sponsored projects to build highly trusted systems? There was a lack of appreciation on the 
part of decision makers of the value of trusted computing. As a result, although trusted 
systems were available in the late 1980s and early 199Os, few such systems were 
purchased. In fact, no major government program of record ever mandated the acquisition 
of trusted systems that provided strong confidence against the threat of subversion. 
Because they were categorized as “munitions”, strong trusted systems were subjected to 
export controls. These controls further limited the market for highly trusted commercial 
products and decreased the incentive for vendors to pursue the development of such 
products. In fact, one major vendor canceled the roll out of a much-anticipated highly 
trusted product after all development and analysis were completed. The artificially limited 
market and complexity associated with international sales were certainly factors working 
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against continued corporate investment in products for which high quality lifecycle 
management would be required. 
Decline in US Capability as Contrasted with non-US Capability 
If the United States were to mount an effort to construct a large highly trusted computing 
system today, there would be no sufficiently large or experienced commercial team to carry 
out the work. A vendor attempting such an effort would need to either assemble a team 
largely from personnel responsible for the early trusted computing work, or teach an entire 
new team all of the science and technology that was previously brought to bear. Because 
colleges and universities are not preparing students in the area of strong trusted computing, 
no recent graduates would be able to participate without a significant period devoted to 
additional education. 
The consensus holds that confidence in the trust.pr0pertie.s of a system must be provided by 
independent review and evaluation rather than the often hyperbolic and misleading claims 
of product vendors. Thus, in order to effectively deploy trusted computing systems, a 
national capability for their evaluation must be available. Evaluators must have the same 
range of scientific and technical background as those who construct highly trusted systems, 
thus they are faced with similar problems: any laboratory or agency charged with the 
independent evaluation of highly trusted systems. would have to reconstitute the necessary 
professional staff to conduct the work. 
How do capabilities in the United States compare to those in the rest of the world? It is well 
known that educational rigor in the United States has declined and that U.S. high school 
and university students rate poorly with respect to mathematics and science students in 
other countries. This is reflected in the lack rigor applied to analysis and specification of 
our computer systems and, naturally, in trusted computing as well. The mindset is to throw 
the systems together and hope that they will run well enough so that flaws will not be a 
major impediment to the systems' use in  the popular market. 
Elsewhere, the requirements for careful analysis and formal rigor in the design and 
development of systems is better appreciated and practiced. Rather than rely on 
questionable commercially available systems, several research and development programs 
in other countries apply rigor to the area of trusted computing and have programs to 
construct their own computers. For example, in 2001 China had approximately 350 
companies with over 500 products.' Just in the area of cryptography, a 2001 report gave a 
total of 1521 cryptographic products produced and developed in 76 countries.2 These 
products included both commercial and end-user products in the areas of hardware, 
software, firmware, and combinations thereof. Germany alone produced a total of 118 of 
these products. Despite an active hacking culture, the scientists and engineers of the former 
Soviet Union have a deep appreciation of the foundations of and techniques for strong 
' China's Computer Security Products Exceed 500, 9 Sept 200 1, 
http://www 1 .chinadaily.co1n.cn/itchi1~a/200 1 - 9-05/3 1 182.html 
' World Wide Survey of Cryptographic Products, NAI Labs, 6 Sept 2001, 
http://download.nai .com/products/medi~pgp/pdf~AI-Labs-C~pto-Survey-9-6-0 1 .pdf 
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trusted computing. Their collaboration with other non-U.S. partners is likely to produce 
formidable results. 
This leads to the question: if key elements of the information systems upon which critical 
national infrastructures rely must be constructed using strong trusted computing 
components, will the United States need to depend upon foreign sources and foreign 
evaluations for those components? What level of comfort would we have, with guarantees 
from those who may be fair weather friends, that these components are free from trap doors 
and other mechanisms that could be controlled by unfriendly adversaries? 
Summary 
Less than a decade ago, the United States possessed the most advanced capabilities iri the 
world for the construction of highly trusted computing components. Today, that capability 
is rapidly dwindling and within the next five to ten years will have disappeared altogether. 
The National Strategy for Trusted Computing must not permit our capability in the area of 
strong trusted computing to be lost; instead that capability must be revitalized. 
The remainder of this paper will present a strategy for reviving strong trusted computing. It 
includes system development, education, and research. To be successful, the program will 
require courage and confidence. Courage to move forward despite the claims of those who 
would ignore the fragility of the infiastructure due to inadequate trusted computing; and 
confidence to build and deploy strong trusted computing products where they are 
desperately needed. 
Strategy for Developing a National Trusted Computing Capability 
In this section we present three interrelated initiatives for developing a National trusted 
computing capability. The first initiative, our Trusted Computing Exemplar project, 
provides a focal point for defining research and education initiatives and a test bed for 
interpreting research results. 
Trusted Computing Exemplar Project 
The purpose of the Trusted Computing Exemplar project proposed by CISR is to provide a 
worked example of how trusted computing systems and components can be constructed. 
The project has four activities: 
’ 
’ 
Create a framework for rapid high assurance system development 
Develop a reference trusted computing component 
Evaluate the component for high assurance 
Disseminate related deliverables via open methodology ‘ 
A trusted computing component will be developed utilizing the high assurance 
development framework. A third party evaluation of the component will commence during 
development (e.g., once the high-level design documentation is written). The 
documentation, source code, and other deliverables will be made openly available as they 
are produced. Co-located teams composed of a combination of seasoned trusted computing 
veterans and uninitiated “apprentices” will perform these activities. 
The combination of open methodology applied to all project documents and deliverables 
and the mentoring of project apprentices will help provide for transfer of trusted computing 
technical know-how to a new generation of trusted computing developers (see also 
“Educational Initiative,” below). Furthermore, the public availability of the high assurance 
development framework and the reference trusted computing component will provide 
technology transfer of key enabling technologies to the commercial, government, and open- 
source communities. 
Framework for Rapid High Assurance Development 
The framework for rapid high assurance development will provide a set of interoperable 
tools and define a set of efficient, repeatable procedures for constructing trusted computing 
systems and components. 
The toolset will provide support for automated management of high assurance development 
throughout a product’s lifecycle. The toolset will support: 
Configuration management of the developed software, tools and processes 
Specification of the security properties and the design 
Verification that the design meets the security properties 
Code development 
Verification that the code implements the design (and only the design) 
Specification based testing 
Teamwork and training support 
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The tools and procedures will also support the open dissemination of project deliverables 
using a philosophy and mechanisms similar to the “open source” approaches. 
We expect that the development fkamework for the Trusted Computing Exemplar project 
will be scaled to the size of the project. It will reveal those aspects of such frameworks that 
must be handcrafted to meet specific project requirements. Generalization of this 
framework to support different target technologies and larger projects is a research topic 
(see “Research Initiative,” below). 
Trusted Computing Reference Component 
We will develop a small-scale high assurance msted computing component as a reference 
implementation. Candidates for implementation ‘include a high-assurance, embedded 
micro kernel to support partitioning of users and information, and a high integrity public 
library for web applications. Because the product as well as the process will be showpieces 
for trusted computing development, high assurance methodologies and techniques will be 
applied during the entire lifecycle (viz., design, implementation, distribution, and 
maintenance phases). The goal is to produce a very small, portable component that will 
take advantage of modern hardware support, where applicable, and that will provide users 
with an a priori assurance against system subversion. 
Reference Component Evaluation 
As noted above, independent evaluation is required to ensure confidence in the assurance 
claims made for a trusted component. The reference component will be subjected to a third- 
party evaluation to ensure that it provides security with high assurance. There are two 
options for the evaluation: the Common Criteria and the Trusted Computer Evaluation 
Criteria (TCSEC). With the Common Criteria, products are evaluated with respect to a 
“protection profile.” There do not currently exist any generally accepted protection profiles 
for high assurance systems or components. Therefore, if the Common Criteria were to be 
used as part of the Trusted Computing Exemplar Project, a high assurance protection 
profile.would need to be developed, first. The TCSEC is a set of criteria that preceded the 
Common Criteria, and that includes specifications for high assurance products (viz., classes 
B3 and Al). While evaluation according to the provisions of the TCSEC is perhaps more 
predictable as a result of historical precedent, the TCSEC is not an active document and the 
results might be considered old fashioned. 
. 
Open Methodology. 
Utilizing the open methodology tools and procedures developed in the High Assurance 
Development Framework (see above), the deliverables and outputs of the Trusted 
Computing Exemplar Project will be made available to the public. This open methodology 
will take advantage of the approaches used by the various “open source” movements to 
provide a continuous set of mechanisms for contribution, evaluation and distribution of the 
various parts of the science and technology. As part of the open methodology activity, the 
development framework will be documented, including methods, techniques, and social 
model, and distributed in an open web-based format. Other deliverables to be made 
available include source code, project plans, and evaluation evidence and reports. Thus, by 
making available these internal documents, the project will provide previously unavailable 
examples of how-to for high assurance trusted computing. 
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Research Initiative 
The National research initiative defines a set of research activities to ensure that the nation 
possesses necessary and sufficient national capacity to develop and maintain highly trusted 
computing systems. A key effect of this work will be to reduce dependence of the national 
Information Infrastructure on high maintenance security mechanisms that are provably 
insufficient, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems. 
The research initiative has two primary thrusts. The first is the development of theory that 
can be used to both describe the security properties of components and systems and to show 
how these properties “compose” to form larger units. Some work has been done in this area 
but there are remarkably few results that have proved useful. The second primary thrust is 
the development of tools that can be used to automatically reason about the component 
properties and the software that is used to build the components. There are a number of 
methodologies that purport to support this and several companies make tools that support 
the methodologies, but the commercial methodologies are not based on a firm theoretical 
foundation so that it is not possible to determine whether the outputs of the methodology 
and the software or systems developed from these outputs have the desired properties. The 
rest of this section provides discussion regarding specific issues and activities of the 
research initiative. 
Modular composition is central to the construction of complex computing systems. The 
advantages of the principles of modularity apply, whether constructing monolithic or 
distributed systems. Yet, work needs to be done to provide a clear scientific underpinning 
for understanding which type of compositions will result in secure or more secure systems. 
For example, the concepts of defense in depth and construction of trusted systemsfiom 
untrusted components need to be clarified. Precisely when do these concepts apply, and 
how is one to assess the result; and conversely, exactly when do these concepts not apply? 
How do we know when a depth of defenses is better than a simple, unified mechanism? 
What are the principles or methodologies under which components can be composed to 
yield a level of trust in their group behavior that is greater than our trust in the behavior of 
the individual components? Similar results from the field of fault tolerance may be 
encouraging at an anecdotal level, but we lack a scientific basis for their applicability to 
security. 
Modular composition for one particular type of security property, “non-interference,” has 
been the subject of past investigations, but there remains a research challenge to determine 
whether the results can be useful in the construction of trusted computing systems. Also, 
research is needed to determine whether any of the analytical methods utilized for non- 
interference are applicable to understanding the composition of other, more general types of 
security policies. If non-interference based composition proves to be too narrow - or worse, 
useless - then alternatives must be investigated. 
Another question regards the composition of application-enforced policies together with 
infrastructure-based policies (e.g., policies enforced by the network fabric, hardware or 
operating systems). For example, to what degree is it possible for an application to enforce 
its own policy regarding entities it creates, if the application’s behavior depends on a weak 
infrastructure? We need a scientific understanding of the requirements on the infrastructure 
for effective application-enforced security policies, so that we know how to construct such 
compositions, and know when they can be considered to be effective. 
. I  
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Regarding the construction of “hybrid-assurance” systems out of components with 
disparate levels of trust, research is needed to understand the precise circumstances under 
which low assurance components can contribute (e.g., to enforcement of security policy). 
Data integrity is a related issue; for example, under what arrangements can low assurance 
components be trusted to handle or manage high integrity data? For what purposes would a 
Trusted System be useful if it did not have the capability to protect the integrity of data 
entrusted to it? 
The engineering principles for construction of monolithic systems, such as layering, 
1 modularity and the role of global variables have a much longer history than those for more 
recent distributed and object-based systems. More basic research needs to be applied to 
understanding how these imd other principles for system building can be applied to secure 
distributed component constructs. For example, what should be the role of layering in the 
prevention of functional interdependencies between distributed modules? Can the concept 
of protection domains help in the design of secure distributed control channels? Could 
system ‘security properties be enhanced if distributed modules are interconnected such that 
each module only depends on modules of equal or higher assurance? 
Our ability to understand the effectiveness of trusted computing systems and our 
approaches for constructing them, such as modular composition, is limited by our lack of 
ability to measure security or trust. How do we know how much security is provided by a 
system? How can the level of trust be specified? 
How do we measure the overall behavioral properties of a set of remote, interconnected 
modules? What security properties are preserved or lost when a module is interconnected 
with a weaker module? Similarly, we lack a theoretical basis for building efficient and 
integrated tools for analyzing trusted computing systems and architectures. To arrive at a 
high degree of trust that an architecture, system or component functions securely, formal 
verification may be required. We lack a theory for how to apply formal verification to 
complex distributed composite systems. Also, given a system of components, each of 
which have been formally verified, can the verification results themselves be composed to 
achieve or assist in the formal verification of the system? And finally, the automatic 
derivation of efficient code fiom high-level security specifications continues to elude us. 
Research is required to provide automated development environments and tools to manage 
the rapid creation of high assurance trusted computing systems. These environments need 
to be generalizable to support the production of a wide range of systems and components, 
so that they are applicable, for example, for constructing high assurance secure networks, 
applications and operating systems, as well as trusted embedded components and 
specialized high assurance interfaces. 
Tools are needed for automating all aspects of the trusted computing development process, 
including design, specification, testing, analysis, verification and configuration 
management. We need to develop tools that will automatically (mechanically) reason about 
the properties of systems. The tools should be usable by a large class of system developers. 
Systems developers should be able to specify “high level” properties of systems that can be 
checked for proper implementation at each stage of development, integration, testing and 
deployment. The tools need to be scalable, such that they can be used for construction of 
large as well as small systems, and they need to be interoperable, so that the different tools 
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work with each other (e.g., compilers and configuration management systems) and are 
integrated with the system development and project management processes. 
Education Initiative 
The purpose of the proposed Education Initiative is two-fold. The first purpose is to 
increase the national capacity to create trusted computing systems by educating developers 
and evaluators in trusted computing development science, methods, and techniques. The 
second, is to increase the national capacity to create developers in trusted computing by 
educating a new generation of teachers in the science, methods and techniques of trusted 
computing development. Our ulterior goal is to increase the security of the national 
Information Infrastructure. The primary determinant of this security is to have trusted 
architectures, systems and components deployed in the infrastructure, as required for 
security. The “first derivative” or limiting factor of this determinant is the availability of 
developers who have the requisite skills to create trusted computing systems and 
components; the “second derivative” is the availability of teachers to create new trusted 
computing developers. Our Education Initiative addresses these limiting factors (first and 
second derivatives) to increasing the security of the national Information Infrastructure. 
The trusted computing education initiative will be based on existing Information Assurance 
education programs and the previously defined Trusted Computing Exemplar (see above). 
The National Security Agency has recognized several Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance Education (CAEIAEs). For the most part, these centers are focused 
on providing education and training regarding issues for information assurance at the user, 
certifier and administrator levels, but they are not generally oriented to teaching the art and 
science of trusted computing system development. We propose establishment of a trusted 
computing-development curricula and teacher education program directed to CAEIAEs 
and other educational institutions with computer security interests. This program will 
provide educational materials for enhancing curricula with trusted computing development 
topics, as well as courses for teachers in how to teach trusted computing development. All 
of these materials and courses will utilize materials produced by the Trusted Computing 
Exemplar, for example, formal and detailed design specifications, code modules, and 
project management documentation. 
To educate new trusted computing developers directly will require the creation of new 
undergraduate, masters, and Ph.D. courses specifically focused on the art and science of 
producing high assurance trusted computing systems. Some materials and content for these 
classes can be adapted from existing computer security courses that are taught at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, such as “Secure Systems” and “Formal Methods.” Other materials 
Exemplar. 
I will be based on documentation, code and other artifacts from the Trusted Computing 
Summary 
In this section, we have described a holistic approach to reversing the national decline in 
the area of trusted computing. It includes our trusted computing exemplar project, a 
national research initiative, and an educational initiative that will build upon the exemplar 
project and research results. 
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